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ABSTRACT
SAFETY AND THE SMALL SATELLITE BUILDER
BY JAMES S. (SID) SMITH
EXPANDING HORIZONS
SAFETY CONSULTING SERVICES

The importance of safety and the early understanding and
incorporation of safety requirements into all phases of
the small satellite's life can not be over-emphasized.
Safety is an engineering discipline, a mind set, a
concious practice of all involved in the small satellite.
There are numerous safety requirements which must be
complied with and there are numerous processes and procedures which the small satellite must be subjected to.
Being aware of the requirements and procedures and
assuring their accomplishment is a total project
responsibility. Risk cannot be totally eliminated,
but it can be managed and controlled. This paper was
written to provide some information on the steps to
successful Risk Management and Risk Acceptance.
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INTRODUCTION
The aerospace accidents which occurred last year have given all of us a
heightened awareness of the need to emphasize safety. The accident
showed dramatically and conclusively the rapidity with which a disaster
can happen. The accident should have provided a lesson in the importance
of systems integration and analysis of the requirement to thoroughly
understand the interaction of components and the overall synergy of
systems. This paper was written to discuss, define and clarify the
systems safety aspects of small satellites and their environments.
OVERVIEW
This paper has been prepared in three sections with the intent to
provide some systems safety philosophy and understanding; a discussion
of requirements, their meanings and application methods; and a summation
with background information.
SCOPE
The intended scope of this paper is the coverage of systems safety for
small satellites. However, totally necessary to any discussion of
satellite safety is an accompanying discussion of booster interfaces
and interactions and ground processing methods, procedures and support
requirements. All are totally interrelated and all requirements have
been written with the total integrated system in mind.
DISCUSSION
Perhaps the single most important factor in the incorporation of safety
requirements into a product is that they be incorporated during the
initial design phase. This of course implies that the designers have
a thorough knowledge of safety requirements and an understanding of the
rationale for why the requirements were formulated. All too often usually when no one person has been assigned safety responsibility the satellite developer learns after hardware has been produced that
some change will be required to satisfy a safety requirement. This
situation creates turmoil throughout all levels of management, increases the cost and frustrates the customer.
Safety requirements are based upon several factors with the prevention
of death or injury and the prevention of damage or loss of property
being the major drivers. Operational responsibility is the determinant for whose requirements must be met. If the satellite is to be
processed and launched by the Department of Defense, one set of
requirements must be met. If the satellite is to be launched aboard
a Space Shuttle and processed by NASA, another set of requirements
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must be. met. There is'a third case when a satellite is launched on
a NASA booster and processed through NASA facilities - such as Wallops
Island and even a fourth case where a spacecraft is processed in a
NASA or DOD facility and launched by NASA on a DOD installation - the
NASA Delta launch pad (SLC-2) at Vandenberg AFB is an example of this
case. The safety issue of satellites launched on commercially developed/
owned boosters is just now being addressed and will undoubtedly have
a number of variations too.
Safety requirements are found in a number of different types of documents and become applicable when the launch/processing agency so
directs. Requirements may be in the form of MIL-Standards; Government
regulations; American Nation~l Standards Institute standards; Boiler,
Electrical and Fire Codes; and various NASA Handbooks, Specifications
and Manuals. With the large number of documents from which to draw
requirements, conflicts are not uncommon. Usually, conflicts are
resolved by applying the "whichever is the most stringent" rule to
the design. Unfortunately, application of this rule is often needlessly expensive. When this case occurs, negotiation to the "common
sense" application level is required. In order to successfully reach
a negotiated settlement, the developer must have a thorough knowledge
of the intent of the requirement and be able to show that the system
complies with the intent.
DEFINITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
Key terminology which the safety engineer/safety manager must become
familiar with includes risk management, risk acceptance and hazard
reduction. All are components of each other. All define the boundaries
of the safety program and measure its effectiveness.
Risk management is the combination of designs, procedures and verifications which enable the operator of systems to function safely.
Hazard reduction is the methodology for reducing hazards and consists
of the following elements which should be applied to systems in order
of precedence:
a)
b)
c)

d)

Design for Minimum Hazard - design out the problem.
Safety Devices - when the hazard cannot be designed out, control
it with automatic safety devices which are incorporated into the
design.
Warning Devices - when neither design nor safety devices can
control hazard warning devices capable of detecting and providing
notice to operators in sufficient time to allow the use of emergency
procedures or corrective actions to return the system to a safe
conditi on.
Special Procedures - Used when design, safety and warning devices
cannot be used to control hazards.

Risk acceptance is the acknowledgement that there is a risk in operating
the system but that the risk has been quantified through verification
methods and that the system can be safely operated.
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Safety analyses are narative assessments of the methods used for
controlling hazards. Safety analyses are prepared in preliminary and
final forms and cover both design and operations. The safety analyses
are used in conjunction with drawings, procedures, and supporting
analyses to prove the safety of the system to launch and processing
agencies. References for preparation of the safety analyses are found
in Data Item Descriptions DI-SAFT-80101, DI-SAFT-80102 and DI-SAFT-80103
(Ref. 1) for NASA expendible and DOD programs. NASA Shuttle programs
use JSC 13830 (Ref. 3) as the reference guide for the preparation of
safety analysis reports. If the program is sponsored by the Air Force
Space Division, the Safety Assessment Reports will be collected in the
Accident Risk Assessment Report (Ref. 2).
The systems safety program plan is used to define the system safety
program which will be used in support of the development effort. The
plan will show functional interfaces and describe organizational
responsibilities. A systems safety program plan is required to the
DOD but is optional to NASA. For the developer1s own use and general
guidance, a system safety program plan should be prepared even though
it may not be required. Data Item Description DI-SAFT-80100 (Ref. 1)
system safety program plan should be used as a guide.
PROCEDURES
The importance of incorporating safety requirements into the design
and th~ early analyses for verification of incorporation cannot be
over emphasized. To assure the timely incorporation of safety requirements safety should be a key item on the agenda of all design
reviews. The person responsible for safety should make a presentation
which details his understanding of the requirements, his methods for
assuring their incorporation, and his role in the verification process.
He should also describe acceptance criteria and his methods for evaluating acceptance.
Both the DOD and NASA have established phased safety reviews for STS
payloads which are conducted during the course of the design effort
and evaluate the incorporation of safety requirements through the
maturity of the program. Entry into the process will be accomplished
either by submitting the safety data to the NASA Johnson Space Center
safety office for NASA sponsored payloads, or, DOD sponsored payloads
will be processed by and the data submitted through the sponsoring
Systems Program Office (SPO).
A more informal process exists for payloads which are to be launched
on expendable boosters and is normally conducted by the launch and
processing agency to determine that the system can be processed and
launched without causing injury to personnel or damage to facilities
or equipment. Payloads processed for launch on either the Eastern
Test Range or the Western Test Range must comply with the requirements
of each range1s safety requirements regulations (Refs. 4 and 5).
Payload builders having NASA sponsorship will be required to submit
their safety data to the sponsoring NASA organization at the respective
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test range and that sponsor will perform the interface activities
between the payload builder and the DOD launch agent. Payloads which
are to be launched on DOD boosters will provide their data directly to
the Safety Office at the respective test ranges.
After a review of the data by the appropriate agencies, DOD or NASA
Safety Review Teams or Test Range Safety personnel, the operator is
given written approval to process, launch and operate the satellite.
The approval may be granted as requested or with conditions stipulated.
SUMMARY
Safety must be considered for all phases and all aspects of the small
satellite just as surely as it must be considered for large satellites,
boosters, and support equipment. Safety requirements are usually common
sense application of good engineering design. System safety is systems
engineering using a different set of criteria. The safety manager is
a member of the design team and is responsible for assuring that safety
requirements are incorporated during design and that all engineers
understand the safety requirements and acceptable methods for applying
them. Safety verification is part of overall systems testing and must
be considered when developing test plans and procedures.
Safety approvals are a key element of operations and are frequently
time consuming. Therefore, an approval cycle must be incorporated
into system schedules. The documentation required to support the
approval process is logical and readily developed during the design
process.
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All documents may be obtained through your sponsor or from the agency
which ;s responsible for the document.
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